Doug wrote:Why don't I feel pain upon experiencing taxation?
Because I'm not a greedy, self-centered bastard like the libertarians and the anarchists.
Governments need money to run on. So give them their due and get on with your life.
That's kind of weird. I don't feel like they're due anything. Just because they do things which benefit me doesn't make me feel like I owe them money. The fact that they threaten me with violence if I don't pay them when I never agreed to pay them in the first place is painful.
I don't know what it has to do with greed or self-centeredness, that makes no sense. The thing that causes me pain is the coercion involved, it has nothing to do with whether or not the money is being used to help people or not. I guess since our particular government uses a lot of the money to kill innocent people in drone strikes and such, that's another painful thing, but that's a separate issue.
David Franks wrote:Indium Flappers wrote:I'm a little surprised that you say "whatever that means" like I said it in a confusing way.
Experience is a very vague word.
What about "observe" then?
David Franks wrote:I said it that way because I feel pain regardless of who it is being taxed, whether it's myself, or another, or a hypothetical individual.
Is it mild, sharp, severe or dull? Shooting, throbbing, burning, tingling? Are there secondary symptoms such as sweating or writhing?
I don't know. All of the above at different points in time I guess?
David Franks wrote:The thought of someone being taxed is itself painful, the way I expect you would find the thought of someone being tortured or killed painful.
That's just silly. There is no similarity between torture and killing, and levying taxes. If the idea of taxation causes you such pain, then you are too frail to live.
Both involve the use of violence. I find it weird that you think there's no similarity.
David Franks wrote:I haven't followed out the thought experiments in my own mind to identify exactly under what conditions the idea of one using coercion against another causes me pain.
Apparently not. If you went so far as to think about it, you'd realize that your pain is irrational.
How do you judge whether particular pains and/or pleasures are rational or irrational? If you don't answer the rest I'll ask you to still answer this.
David Franks wrote:As for coercion, nobody requires a citizen to stay here. If you find taxation painful, go somewhere else. Until you leave, assuming your frail self isn't carried off by the next breeze, feel free to use our infrastructure and civic/social amenities. After all, you're helping to pay for them. Of course, you derive benefits from them beyond what you pay for even if you feel you don't "get your money's worth" from them. And you're not going to have any success at living without them.
This is just the same canard statists always use. It's like looking at a world with lots of crime, and saying that you consent to be robbed by random people on the street because you know you will be unless you leave for a place without any robbers, even though there are street robbers everywhere. See the second and third links above.
David Franks wrote:I'm trying to identify the specific differences between the way I react emotionally and the way they react emotionally.
Why? It's a silly pursuit of the silly.
I provided several reasons in my post.
David Franks wrote:"Men are disturbed not by things, but by the attitudes which they choose to take about things." --Epictetus
Hmm. I guess I'll think about that.
To be honest I think you would probably reject the quote if applied to things which disturb you, like the example of torture above. You wouldn't tell me it's the attitude you take towards torture which makes it disturbing to you, would you? Or would you?
David Franks wrote:I don't believe in objective morality. Technically, if you press me far enough, I don't believe in "morality" at all.
What is your substitute, if you have one?
Well, I can observe the emotions that I feel through introspection, and I can observe my own behavior, and I can make predictions about how I will behave based on what I feel. I don't like feeling pain, I like feeling pleasure, and I have the ability to empathize with others, so that in many cases thinking someone else is feeling pain or pleasure leads me to feel it as well, meaning, in others words, I don't like other people feeling pain, and I don't like causing others pain, but I do like other people being happy and I enjoy trying to make them happy.
So, as basic rules of thumb, I try to act in such a way as to make myself and other people happy, and not to make myself or others miserable, because I'm human and human beings act in that kind of a way.
There's a Kurt Vonnegut quote that I'm thinking of in relation to this, but I can't find it now.
David Franks wrote:You can call me a sociopath for that if you like.
Since I don't know you and I am not familiar with the way you act, I'll refrain from calling you anything. As "sociopath" is a diagnostic term, my calling you a sociopath would be a euphemism. I'm not trained to tell the difference between a sociopath and an asshole.
What does "libertarians aren't sociopaths" mean?
That's not what I said.
Um... What?
David Franks wrote:A far better question is, why would you feel pain upon experiencing (whatever that means) taxation?
Is this going to turn into a touchy-feely proposal that hopes to show that libertarians aren't sociopaths?
Please do me the favor of explaining how my quote misrepresented what you said, if you would be so kind.
David Franks wrote:I suppose I could say I subjectively think that people who defend the use of violence against innocent people are sociopaths, and I could say I subjectively think defense of taxation entails this, but why?
Why, indeed? The "threat of violence", "at the point of a gun" aspect of your argument is just more silliness when you apply it to the government. (It does hold up, though, when you apply it to militias and assorted other right-wing "patriots" who employ guns and bombs in their objections to taxation.)
This is breathtakingly bizarre. It's an observation that governments make threats of violence against those they tax, and that they enforce taxation with guns. They don't keep it a secret. Is it the act of making the observation that you find silly, or my expression of how I feel about it, (also an expression of something I've observed, since I observe my emotions introspectively)?
David Franks wrote:Emotions aren't beliefs. They aren't true or false
But, like beliefs, they are rational or irrational.
In what way? Be specific. Explain how emotions can be rational or irrational, and the objective criteria by which you discern into which category they fall.
David Franks wrote:Empirically, I think by calling me one you would mean that you don't like the way I feel, you're claiming that you feel a particular emotion towards me.
No, not at all. Again, I'm not trained to recognize the difference between a sociopath and an asshole. However, I tend to think of libertarians (well, and anarchists) as sociopaths because as a group, they have made a philosophy and mania of their inability to live (voluntarily, remember) within the structure of a society that shares goals, concerns, and efforts. Come to think of it, I know a couple of anarchists who are both sociopathic and assholes. They just plain lack the charm that a sociopath can adopt as part of his condition.
Ok. Sharing goals, concerns and efforts doesn't require threats of violence, or, more to the point, violations of consent. If I share goals and concerns with someone, then we can share our effort to meet those goals and concerns, and if I don't, we can go our own ways. If I want to help the poor, I can work with another person who has the same desire to do so. We don't need to threaten some third person with violence in order to get his property and use it to farther our project. I like having people organize to help each other, and I dislike making people join organizations they don't want to join. There's no contradiction in that. I like cooperation, I dislike submission and the making of others to submit.
David Franks wrote:What I do want to do is try to figure out exactly under what conditions you like and/or dislike coercion
There's that silly exaggeration again. I am not coerced to pay taxes. I take the responsibility of paying taxes because I derive benefits from the efforts government, and, while I don't approve of everything the government does, I also understand that we don't all like the same things. We historically have a general agreement as to what the country should be, and a large part of that agreement is an accommodation of diversity.
Taxation is not theft; not paying taxes is theft.
Ok, let me see.
- "I am not coerced to pay taxes."
- "I take the responsibility of paying taxes because I derive benefits from the efforts government, and..."
- "while I don't approve of everything the government does..."
- "I also understand that we don't all like the same things."
- "We historically have a general agreement as to what the country should be, and a large part of that agreement is an accommodation of diversity."
- "Taxation is not theft; not paying taxes is theft."
I agree with your claims that:
- you gain benefits from things the government does
- you don't agree with everything the government does
- we don't all like the same things
- you understand that we don't all like the same things
I can also agree that you pay taxes because you perceive the above four claims as being true. That seems to me like a sensible explanation of your own behavior.
I'm not sure who the "we" refers to in "We historically have a general agreement as to what the country should be, and a large part of that agreement is an accommodation of diversity.", but I don't consider myself a part of it, and I kind of doubt that you consider me a part of it.
As for the first claim, "I am not coerced to pay taxes.", I think this is misleading. If a parent tells their children to go to bed, and the parent normally makes their children go to bed through force when they decide not to, and the children know this, then there's a threat of coercion involved in the parent's command. Let's say one child wants to go to bed, and the other does not. The one who wants to go to bed would agree to go to bed even without the threat of coercion, but the one who doesn't only goes to bed because of the threat of coercion.
Obviously the second child, who only goes to bed because of the threat of coercion, is being coerced. I'm not sure whether most people would say the first child is being coerced or not. The threat of coercion is still present, which implies that they are. But since they want to go and would agree to go anyway, in a way they do consent to go to bed voluntarily, which implies that they aren't.
To be honest, I think it makes more sense to me to say that both are being coerced, that the threat alone is enough to make it coercive, regardless of the actions of the children.
Anyways, since you would pay taxes even without the threat of violence should you not, it doesn't seem to cause you much pain to pay them, so I think I can feel less pain over you in particular. But I don't like it that the government has the ability to threaten anyone, generally.
Now, the last two claims:
"Taxation is not theft."
[N]ot paying taxes is theft."
Theft means taking justly owned property from its just owner without their consent. It may involve violence, (mugging someone), or it may not, (stealing someone's car when they're on the other side of the planet, so that they aren't even aware you've done it at the time.) Taxation does involve threats of violence against those who decide not to pay taxes. So this leaves us with the question of whether the person being taxed is the just owner of the tax-money, (or whatever property the tax-collector demands,) or not. You seem to think the tax-collector is the just owner of the property.
In the Rothbardian property order, everything starts out as unowned, and use of unowned property makes the user the just owner. Property is sticky, so that the just owner remains the just owner even if they aren't using their property continuously. Just owners can abandon their property, making it unowned again, and decide to make another individual the just owner of their property, transferring the property title.
Rothbard didn't mind the use of violence by just property owners to keep others from using their property, he did mind the use of violence against just property owners to force the owners to allow the use of their property. If the owner allowed others to use their property as a result of such an act of force, Rothbard considered the owner to still be the just owner of the property in question, and the others to be thieves.
Defense of taxation from within this property order seems to usually come down to arguing that by living within the domain of a government, and using the services the government provides, property owners voluntarily transfer the title of some of their property to the government. If we start with a world with a few individuals living without a government, and one individual decides to set themselves up as governor and start levying taxes, and then they go to someone living within the area they claim as being within their domain, and assert that some of the property of that individual belongs rightly to them, then this assertion seems so far to have no basis. If the individual agrees, (under conditions not involving threats of coercion,) to pay the governor a certain amount in exchange for a service, (a business relationship,) and the governor follows through, then the governor is the just owner of whatever property the customer agreed to pay in exchange for the service, because they voluntarily transferred their property title to the governor. But if someone decides they don't want to enter such a contract, the governor can't threaten them with violence within Rothbard's property order. In such a case, the taxation would be theft, in the other case of the person who agreed to the service contract, the taxation isn't taxation at all, it's just a customer purchasing a service from someone. Very few people call it taxation when we pay someone to wash our car.
Whether the individual continues to live in the area the governor declares as within his domain is irrelevant. Unless you think the governor owns all of that land. At which point, one has to ask, how did they become the just owner of all that land? (They didn't.)
In the case of the government which now exists, I'm not sure what I've done which you would consider as giving my consent to be taxed. If it's living in the area in which I live, the government isn't the just owner of the land on which I live, so that doesn't work. If it's saying the pledge of allegiance or something as a child, or having my parents consent on my behalf, then I simply reject the idea that that's valid.
Walter Block's article talks about how governments start claiming "ownership" over land without getting the current owners to cede the title, and deals with a few other similar arguments.
I guess it seems obvious enough to me that taxation is theft that I have trouble understanding how someone could believe it's not. Without understanding this I find it harder to refute. It's like trying to refute someone who claims the sky is made of cheese, I can't get over my astonishment to identify the cause of their belief.
Oh well.
Edit: In thinking about it, I have decided the statement I made above, "Rothbard didn't mind the use of violence by just property owners to keep others from using their property", is inaccurate, and I wish to retract it. I perceive it as inaccurate in the following ways.
1) Rothbard repeatedly made clear that he did not consider his property order to supply what he would have called a full moral code. Acting within his property order was not sufficient to escape his condemnation or earn his approval, he thought people had obligations above and beyond it. It is unclear to me whether he regarded acting within his property order as necessary to escape his condemnation/earn his approval, or whether he regarded it as a general principle to which certain exceptions applied. Most Rothbardians seem to take the second approach, allowing for exceptions.
2) Rothbard combined the system I roughly described with a principle of reciprocity, he thought someone was acting within his property order if they responded to theft in kind, for instance using coercion to retrieve stolen property, but not if coercion was used beyond a certain point. Killing a child for shoplifting a candy bar would have been aggression within his system, because the act of killing was not a reciprocal act compared to the act of shoplifting a candy bar. He discussed where the line would be drawn in a libertarian society, but I don't remember him coming to a firm conclusion, it's a matter of debate among nonaggressionists.
3) I personally have a lot of sympathy for pacifism, and I think I implied otherwise in stating it as I did. If not pacifism, I guess I'd prefer to minimize the amount of violence I experience, or only use violence and coercion to the degree required to stop it, in cases when I think I can reasonably predict its use will indeed lead to it stopping. (In some cases, self-defense may fail to defuse a situation, the most effective way to stop a conflict may be to respond to aggressors by treating them as friends rather than enemies, and leaving them a path to begin acting like a friend instead of an enemy.)
In any case, I don't think these corrections change the discussion over taxation.